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DEFINING THE LINE BETWEEN CONSTITUTIONALLY 
PROTECTED SPEECH AND TRUE THREATS: CAN I BE 
ARRESTED FOR BEING ANNOYING? 
CRIMINAL COURT OF NEW YORK 
NEW YORK CITY 
 
People v. Brodeur1 
(decided July 18, 2013) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States Constitution states, “[c]ongress shall make 
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech.”2  This procla-
mation grants all citizens a right to free speech, and case law has 
demonstrated how this fundamental right cannot be easily abridged.  
For example, one court held, “[t]he First Amendment of the United 
States Constitution forbids the silencing of speech merely because it 
is objectionable or offensive to the listener.”3  Only “well-defined and 
narrowly limited classes [of speech] . . . including the lewd and ob-
scene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or fighting words 
which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an imme-
diate breach of the peace may properly be proscribed.”4  New York’s 
Aggravated Harassment statute, which authorizes a limitation on free 
speech, states: 
[a] person is guilty of aggravated harassment in the 
second degree when, with intent to harass, annoy, 
threaten or alarm another person, he or she . . . [e]ither 
(a) communicates with a person, anonymously or oth-
erwise, by telephone, by telegraph, or by mail, or by 
 
1 969 N.Y.S.2d 774 (Crim. Ct. 2013). 
2 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
3 Brodeur, 969 N.Y.S.2d at 776 (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989)). 
4 Id. (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942)). 
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transmitting or delivering any other form of written 
communication, in a manner likely to cause annoyance 
or alarm.5 
Even though a majority of New York case law holds that New York’s 
Aggravated Harassment Statute is in compliance with the First 
Amendment, some federal and New York courts have held that the 
statute is unconstitutional.6 
The parties in Brodeur, complainant Harry Stuckey and de-
fendant Christopher Brodeur, decided to enter into a lease of a loft 
space in Williamsburg, New York.7  At this time, Brodeur and Stuck-
ey had known each other for over ten years and had experienced dif-
ficulty working with each other in the past.8  Brodeur was known to 
be a person with a “propensity for exaggeration of every perceived 
wrong.”9  Nevertheless, the two leased the space in order to use it for 
their artistic work, storage, events, and parties.10  Brodeur originally 
located the space and raised the initial rent and security required by 
the landlord.11  However, Brodeur lacked the full financial resources 
to satisfy the landlord, so he turned to Stuckey to finance the lease.12  
The lease was executed in January of 2009 without Brodeur’s name 
on the lease.13 
Shortly thereafter, a dispute arose as to who possessed control 
of the lease.14  Stuckey argued that he had sole control since his name 
was on the lease, while Brodeur believed he was in control of the 
lease because of his initial undertakings to obtain it.15  Brodeur at-
tempted to exercise his control when he moved into one of the rooms, 
 
5 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.30(1) (McKinney 2012). 
6 See infra sections III.B, IV.A for cases that held Aggravated Harassment statute uncon-
stitutional. 
7 Brodeur, 969 N.Y.S.2d at 776. 
8 Id. at 779. 
9 Id. at 781.  The court also took note of Brodeur’s endeavors as “muckraker” because he 
was arrested numerous times due to protests.  Stuckey was well aware of Brodeur’s behav-
ioral tendencies because he stated anyone who was a subject of Brodeur’s ire was labeled a 
child molester and a rapist.  Id. 
10 Id. at 776, 779. 
11 Brodeur, 969 N.Y.S.2d at 776, 779. 
12 Id. at 776.  Stuckey agreed to lease the space in the name of a corporation, V. Media 
Inc., of which he was President.  Id. 
13 Id. at 779. 
14 Id. at 776. 
15 Brodeur, 969 N.Y.S.2d at 779.  Stuckey testified he had control of the lease because he 
personally guaranteed the corporate obligations to the landlord, which made him personally 
liable on the rent.  Id. 
2
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and, in turn, Stuckey moved into the premises as well.16  About one 
month after the lease was signed, Stuckey removed Brodeur from the 
premises by the means of self-help and changed the locks to the 
property.17 
After Brodeur’s ejectment, animosity between the parties 
spiked when Brodeur stated he would kill Stuckey if Brodeur was not 
returned to occupancy or given control of the premises.18  During this 
time, Brodeur also placed a poster on a door of another residence of 
Stuckey’s, which stated: “Wanted!  Call 911 if you see this man!  His 
name is Harry Stuckey and he is a violent drug dealer and child mo-
lester/rapist.  Call 911.”19  Brodeur was charged with Attempted Ag-
gravated Harassment in the Second Degree because of his verbal 
threats to kill Stuckey and the written threats of the poster.20 
The court decided that, in regard to the threats, a mixed ques-
tion of law and fact would determine Brodeur’s guilt under the stat-
ute.21  The court held as a matter of law, Brodeur’s verbal statements 
threatening to kill Stuckey amounted to a true threat.22  However, the 
court then analyzed Brodeur’s verbal statements under a contextual 
approach by scrutinizing the rocky relationship of the parties, the ev-
idence of Brodeur’s propensity to exaggerate in various situations, 
and Stuckey’s own reaction to the statements to support its finding 
that the First Amendment protected the verbal threats.23 
The court concluded the poster was a true threat.24  As a mat-
ter of law, Brodeur’s admission that he placed the poster on Stuck-
 
16 Id.  This caused further friction between the parties because Brodeur did not want 
Stuckey to occupy the other room as Brodeur wanted to lease out the remaining rooms to 
raise money for rent.  Id. 
17 Id. at 779. 
18 Brodeur, 969 N.Y.S.2d at 779-80.  It is important to note the context of the situation in 
which the comments were made.  Several witnesses who heard Brodeur’s statements about 
Stuckey were Board members who the court stated had no legal authority.  Id.  “The testi-
mony of several witnesses was that the “Board” meetings were more akin to parties, with the 
participants being in various states of intoxication.”  Id. at 780. 
19 Id. at 783. 
20 Id. at 776.  Brodeur was also charged with Stalking in the Fourth Degree (N.Y. PENAL 
LAW § 120.45(3) (McKinney 2012)) and Harassment in the Second Degree (N.Y. PENAL 
LAW § 240.26(2) (McKinney 2012)).  Brodeur, 969 N.Y.S.2d at 776.  The stalking charge is 
not an issue in this article. 
21 Id. at 778. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 779-83.  For a further discussion of the court’s contextual analysis regarding 
Brodeur’s verbal threats, see infra section II.D. 
24 Id. at 784. 
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ey’s door constituted a true threat.25  In context, the poster also ex-
emplified a true threat because a reasonable person in Stuckey’s posi-
tion would be alarmed upon viewing the poster because it would put 
the person in apprehension of harm, and the court stated that Stuckey 
himself was annoyed and afraid because of the unknown conse-
quences of the poster.26 
The process of determining whether a person’s conduct 
amounts to a true threat requires a full contextual analysis and an un-
derstanding of the implications of limiting a person’s speech under 
the First Amendment.  The issue here is not just whether a person is 
guilty under New York’s Aggravated Harassment statute, but, more 
broadly, how certain acts cross the barrier from protected speech un-
der the First Amendment to unprotected speech subject to criminal 
penalty. 
II. THE COURT’S REASONING 
The court in Brodeur assumed New York’s Aggravated Har-
assment statute was constitutional on its face, but it recognized the 
delicate balance between protecting a person’s First Amendment 
right and correctly applying the statute to the situation before it.27  
The court noted that when a person’s free speech is at issue, the ap-
plication of a legitimate restriction on free speech requires an analysis 
as a matter of law and of fact.28  For the factual analysis, the court in 
Brodeur brought an objective and subjective contextual approach to 
determine the true intent of the defendant.29 
A. Elements of Guilt Under the Statute – What Is a 
“True Threat”? 
“A genuine threat is one that is serious, should reasonably 
have been taken to be serious, or was confirmed by other words or 
 
25 Brodeur, 969 N.Y.S.2d at 784. 
26 Id.  For a further discussion of the court’s contextual analysis regarding the poster 
threats, see infra section II.D. 
27 Id. at 776, 777 (“The evidence in this case raises multiple issues, most importantly the 
juxtaposition of the statutes at issue with the First Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion and the right of Defendant to free speech.”). 
28 Id. at 778. 
29 See infra section II.C.1-2. 
4
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conduct.”30  Further, conduct or speech is considered a true threat if 
the speaker intends to invoke fear or violence upon the listener.31  So-
cietal norms and policies carry some weight when considering 
whether certain speech amounts to a true threat, but just because 
speech may be objectionable, it does not necessarily mean it is pro-
scribed under the law.32  True threats are also clear, unambiguous, 
and immediate; there should not be an element of vagueness or un-
certainty for an action to be considered proscribed speech.33 
B. True Threat Determination Under the Statute – A 
Mixed Question of Law and Fact 
When analyzing whether speech or conduct constitutes a true 
threat, the court in Brodeur looked to federal and state case law to de-
termine its own approach.  The court noted that a person’s protection 
under the First Amendment is not abridged when looking at narrowly 
limited classes of prohibited speech.34  Proscribable speech is “lewd 
and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting 
words’ . . . that may incite an immediate breach of the peace.”35  
When conducting an analysis as a matter of law, true threats may be 
found in numerous phrases that people say throughout their daily 
lives when looking at the words alone.  As the court in Brodeur stat-
ed, an angry baseball fan shouting “kill the umpire” may be consid-
ered a true threat as a matter of law due to the face value of the 
words.36  But, when considering the severity of a limitation on a per-
son’s First Amendment right, a literal interpretation of an individual’s 
 
30 Brodeur, 969 N.Y.S.2d at 777 (quoting People v. Hernandez, 795 N.Y.S.2d 862, 866 
(Crim. Ct. 2005)). 
31 Id. (quoting People v. Olivio, 800 N.Y.S.2d 353 (Crim. Ct. 2005)). 
32 Id. at 776 (regarding the defendant’s burning the American flag at a political demon-
stration; although the defendant’s action was arguably morally condemnable speech, the 
court found the conduct did not threaten to destroy free speech) (citing Johnson, 491 U.S. at 
414). 
33 Id. (citing People v. Yablov, 706 N.Y.S.2d 591, 595 (Crim. Ct. 2000)). 
34 Id.; see also Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72. 
35 Brodeur, 969 N.Y.S.2d at 776 (noting that various courts have also looked at whether 
the defendant’s speech contained “fighting words”) (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-
72).  Fighting words “are likely to cause a fight.  So are threatening, profane or obscene 
revilings.”  Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573.  See also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 
(1971) (noting that fighting words are “those personally abusive epithets which, when ad-
dressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to 
provoke violent reaction.”). 
36 Brodeur, 969 N.Y.S.2d at 777. 
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speech may not be the only basis of determination.37 
 
C. Context – A Way To Fill in the Gray Area of the 
Law 
Federal and state case law has portrayed different courts ap-
plying a contextual analysis in its true threat analysis.  Many “lewd” 
or “obscene” words may fall into the definition of a true threat as a 
matter of law, but when taken into context, determining the true 
meaning of obscene speech brings a new level of analysis.38  In Peo-
ple v. Dietze,39 the New York Supreme Court took a very narrow ap-
proach in its application of the statute.40  In this case, the defendant 
made various statements calling the complainant a “bitch” and her 
son a “dog.”41  The defendant also stated that he would “beat up” the 
complainant one day or night, but this evidence was not enough to 
place the defendant’s conduct within the confines of the statute.42   
The court first held speech is not forbidden unless it presents 
a clear and present danger of some serious substantive evil.43  The 
court relied on a more descriptive meaning of a “true threat,” in 
which a “substantive evil” seemed to denote a more serious and in-
depth definition of a true threat.44  This definition was considerably 
narrower than the meaning accorded by the federal courts to a true 
threat, which was “lewd” and “obscene” speech.45  Second, the court 
found a contextual examination facilitated making a well-versed de-
 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 778. 
39 549 N.E.2d 1166 (N.Y. 1989). 
40 Id. at 1168, 1173-74. 
41 Id. at 1167.  The court also noted that the defendant’s actions were directed towards the 
complainant and her son, who were both mentally disabled.  Id.  It also commented that the 
defendant knew of their mental disabilities, and had been warned by police on a prior occa-
sion to refrain from arguing with them again.  Id. 
42 Dietze, 549 N.E.2d at 1167-70.  “There is nothing in the record demonstrating that de-
fendant's statement that she would ‘beat the crap out of [complainant] some day or night in 
the street’ was either serious, should reasonably have been taken to be serious, or was con-
firmed by other words or acts showing that it was anything more than a crude outburst.”  Id. 
at 54. 
43 Id. at 1168. 
44 Id. at 1168.  (“Speech is often ‘abusive’—even vulgar, derisive, and provocative—and 
yet it is still protected under the State and Federal constitutional guarantees of free expres-
sion unless it is much more than that.”). 
45 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. 
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cision regarding the true meaning of a person’s speech.46  Although 
the defendant’s statements contemplated some sort of physical harm 
to the complainant in the near future, the court found the statements 
to be unsupported and more of a temporary loss of self-control.47  
Human nature is indicative of how people can “lose their cool” over 
certain events, so mere outbursts are not meant to be taken serious-
ly.48  The court in Dietze recognized the importance in the constitu-
tional protection of speech and held context was needed to prove the 
defendant’s true intentions.49 
1. Looking At Context Through the Reasonable 
Recipient – The Objective Test 
Because the surrounding circumstances are critical in provid-
ing the context in which the speech occurred, the court in Brodeur al-
so included an analysis of whether a reasonable recipient, familiar 
with the context of the communication, would interpret Brodeur’s 
words or conduct to constitute a true threat.50  This objective test pro-
vided the court with an unbiased analysis of a true threat, free of any 
party’s hypersensitivities.51  This test was previously applied to the 
facts in People v. Mitchell,52 in which the defendant called the com-
plainant forty-five times and left her ten voice messages in which he 
repeatedly threatened to kill her child.53  The complainant also stated 
that the defendant pounded on her door for forty-five minutes threat-
ening to kill her if she was with another man.54  After considering the 
context, the court determined that the defendant’s conduct was a true 
threat because a reasonable recipient would be alarmed by the repeti-
tive communication, which served no legitimate purpose.55  Also, as a 
matter of law, the court reasoned that the calls and messages were le-
 
46 Dietze, 549 N.E.2d at 1168-69. 
47 Id. at 1169-70. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Brodeur, 969 N.Y.S.2d at 777. 
51 See Doe v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 623-24 (8th Cir. 2002) (sup-
porting the reasonable recipient approach even though it disregards a person’s distinctive 
sensitivity).  “[T]he recipient's reaction still must be a reasonable one even if he or she suf-
fers some unique sensitivity . . . .”  Id. 
52 No. 26317C–2009, 2009 WL 2929790 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Cnty. July 23, 2009). 
53 Id. at *1. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at *2, *3. 
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gally sufficient on their face to constitute a true threat due to the lan-
guage of the defendant’s statements.56  Therefore, aside from the 
analysis as a matter of law, the reasonable recipient test proved help-
ful in the court’s contextual inquiry because it provided an objective 
examination of a true threat. 
2. Did the Intended Recipient Believe It Was a 
Threat? – The Subjective Test 
The intended recipient test serves the opposite purpose of the 
reasonable recipient test because the intended recipient’s own reac-
tion to the conduct at issue is analyzed instead of examining whether 
a reasonable person would be alarmed by the conduct or speech.57  
Although numerous judicial opinions from both New York courts and 
federal courts tend to apply the objective reasonable recipient test in 
lieu of the subjective intended recipient test, the court in Brodeur ap-
plied the intended recipient test along with the reasonable recipient 
test in order to further analyze the surrounding circumstances of the 
volatile dispute.58  The court looked to United States v. Turner59 for 
the intended recipient analysis.  In Turner, the court considered 
whether the defendant’s comments on his website, which stated three 
federal judges should be killed, constituted a true threat.60  The de-
fendant also posted photographs, work addresses, and room numbers 
of the judges on his website along with the death threats.61  Conse-
quently, the judges were extremely alarmed by the substantial num-
ber of threats made by the defendant, and one judge stated his imme-
diate reaction to the threats was “somebody was threatening to kill 
me.”62  The court found the victimized judges’ testimony regarding 
their reaction to the statements as highly relevant and not prejudicial 
when used to determine whether a true threat was made.63  Therefore, 
the intended recipient analysis provided further proof that the defend-
 
56 Id. at *3-4. 
57 Brodeur, 969 N.Y.S.2d at 778, 781, 782, 783. 
58 Id. 
59 720 F.3d 411 (2d Cir. 2013). 
60 Id. at 413, 415-23. 
61 Id. at 415-17, 423. 
62 Id. at 416 (noting that the judges were reasonably worried because they were well 
aware that the defendant referred on his website with admiration to Matthew Hale, who was 
convicted of soliciting the murder of a judge the plaintiff jurists all knew). 
63 Id. at 428-29. 
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ant’s conduct had an alarming effect upon the complainants.64 
D. How a Mixed Question of Law and Fact 
Determined Brodeur’s Protection and 
Condemnation 
The contextual approach applied by the court in Brodeur en-
tailed an immense analysis of the objective reasonable recipient test 
in order to ensure Brodeur’s free speech was not unjustly limited.65  
Applying the objective test, the court in Brodeur held that a reasona-
ble person in the position of Stuckey would not have taken the verbal 
threats seriously because a reasonable person would have known of 
Brodeur’s propensity to exaggerate issues in which he was in-
volved.66  Also, a reasonable person would have known, or should 
have known, that Brodeur would become enraged at Stuckey’s re-
moving him from the premises, especially in the manner Stuckey re-
moved Brodeur.67  Therefore, a reasonable recipient should have 
known those verbal threats were mainly outbursts due to Brodeur’s 
persona and the circumstances at hand.68 
However, when applying the reasonable recipient test to the 
poster Brodeur placed on Stuckey’s door, the court held a reasonable 
person would find the poster to be threatening.69  A reasonable person 
may think he could be arrested at any moment and perhaps suffer 
physical harm if apprehended by the police.70  The ultimate differ-
ence between the verbal threat and the poster, under the reasonable 
recipient analysis, was that the reasonable recipient would have 
known, or should have known, that Brodeur’s verbal threats were ex-
aggerated, whereas the poster presented an element of the unknown.71  
 
64 Turner, 720 F.3d at 429 (“[P]roof of the effect of the alleged threat upon the addressee 
is highly relevant.”) (quoting United States v. Davila, 461 F.3d 298, 305 (2d Cir. 2006)). 
65 Brodeur, 969 N.Y.S.2d at 777. 
66 Id. at 781. 
67 Id. at 779-80. (noting that Stuckey removed Brodeur from the premises via self-help 
and changed the locks to the space). 
68 Id. at 780. 
69 Id. at 784. 
70  Brodeur, 969 N.Y.S.2d 784 (stating that unlike Brodeur’s verbal threats, “in contrast to 
our analysis of Defendant's verbal statements, Defendant's propensity for hyperbole and ex-
aggeration, as known to Stuckey, does not save him from liability for the poster.”).  After the 
court concluded its contextual analysis, it found the surrounding events did not support First 
Amendment protection for Brodeur.  Id. 
71 Id. 
9
Dolzani: Can I Be Arrested for Being Annoying?
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2014
994 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30 
Because viewers of the poster unfamiliar with the situation may have 
taken action and called the police as the sign demanded, the poster 
ultimately presented a threat to the complainant’s privacy72 and liber-
ty.73 
While basing a judicial analysis on one person’s belief is nev-
er a wholly sound process in our judicial system, it appeared to serve 
a greater contextual purpose in Brodeur.74  Similar to the court in 
Turner, the court in Brodeur used the intended recipient test to ana-
lyze Stuckey’s actual response to Brodeur’s conduct.75  The court in 
Brodeur held the test did not create prejudicial analysis because other 
elements of the contextual analysis already established the evidence 
regarding what constituted a true threat.76  The court also stated that 
Stuckey found the poster to be threatening because he was alarmed, 
afraid, and annoyed upon seeing the poster on his door.77  Therefore, 
the court believed that Brodeur’s intention was to annoy and alarm 
Stuckey, and further instill fear in Stuckey because of the message on 
the poster.78 
III. THE FEDERAL APPROACH 
When determining whether a person’s questionable conduct is 
afforded First Amendment protection, federal courts analyze various 
proscribable conduct and speech statutes.  Case law shows certain 
courts applying a broad approach regarding what speech or conduct is 
threatening and not protected, while other courts take a more narrow 
approach in determining what makes certain speech or conduct a true 
threat.79 
 
72 See infra section IV.A-B for a discussion on privacy interests in relation to application 
of proscribable speech/conduct statutes. 
73 Brodeur, 969 N.Y.S.2d at 784-85. 
74 Id. at 779, 781-83. 
75 Id. at 781-83.  See Turner, 720 F.3d at 428-29 (noting the testimony of each victim 
judge was given great weight by the court). 
76 Brodeur, 969 N.Y.S.2d at 778, 781-83. 
77 Id. at 784 (noting how the court did not find Stuckey a “wholly credible” witness be-
cause he portrayed as much exaggeration as Brodeur displayed, but the court believed Stuck-
ey’s testimony concerning his alarm caused by the poster was justified). 
78 Id. at 784-85. 
79 See infra section III. 
10
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A. Does It Sound Like a Threat?  It Is a Threat – The 
Broad Application Approach 
The court in United States v. Bellrichard80 applied the objec-
tive reasonable recipient test under a contextual true threat analysis to 
find a broad scope of conduct and speech that was not protected un-
der the First Amendment.81  The defendant in Bellrichard was con-
victed of sending threatening communications through the mail to 
various government officials.82  The court in Bellrichard found the 
reasonable recipient test of a contextual analysis to be sufficient when 
determining whether one’s speech or conduct was appropriately pro-
scribed.83  In this case, the defendant had a history of sending mail-
ings to local officials regarding issues in which he was interested.84  
One letter, which was addressed to the county attorney, stated, “you 
will die,” and “[i]f they go to prison you’ll be dead in less than 7 
months—so help me God!”85  The defendant did not deny that he 
wrote the letters, but he argued the conduct was protected under the 
First Amendment.86  The court did not agree with the defendant and 
found the defendant’s mailings a true threat.87  The court primarily 
focused on whether the mailings were a direct threat to the listener.88  
In doing so, the court held that a reasonable person would believe 
mailings sent to a person’s home are a true and direct threat.89  The 
contextual analysis, involving the reasonable recipient’s belief, led 
the court to find that the First Amendment did not protect the defend-
ant’s mailings.90 
 
80 994 F.2d 1318 (8th Cir. 1993). 
81 Id. at 1322, 1324. 
82 Id. at 1319-21. 
83 Id. at 1323-24. 
84 Id. at 1320-21. 
85 Bellrichard, 994 F.2d at 1322 (regarding the defendant’s intention to carry out physical 
harm on the complainant if two juveniles, in a case he was interested in, were sentenced to 
an adult prison). 
86 Id. at 1322. 
87 Id. at 1321-23 (“Bellrichard’s communications, viewed in context, would permit a rea-
sonable jury to find that the communication conveys ‘a determination or intent to injure 
presently or in the future.’ ”) (quoting Martin v. United States, 691 F.2d 1235, 1240 (8th Cir. 
1982)).  Also, Bellrichard admitted that he wrote the letters, and the specific address on the 
mailings would show the threats were directed towards the listener.  Id. at 1321-22. 
88 Id. at 1321-23. 
89 Bellrichard, 994 F.2d at 1321-23; see infra section IV.A (noting that direct threats are 
connected to an invasion of privacy). 
90 Bellrichard, 994 F.2d at 1322, 1324. 
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B. What Actually Constitutes “Alarming” Speech? – 
The Narrow Application Approach 
In order to protect a person’s First Amendment rights, some 
courts have narrowly applied proscribable speech or conduct statutes 
only in cases where the conduct fell squarely within the language of 
the statute.91  In Cohen v. California,92 the defendant was convicted 
of the offense of disturbing the peace after he wore a jacket that bore 
the statement “Fuck the Draft” in a courthouse where women and 
children were present.93  The defendant stated that he was aware of 
the message he displayed because it exemplified his true feelings to-
wards the Vietnam War.94  On appeal, the Supreme Court applied a 
thorough contextual analysis.95  First, the Court held that, as a matter 
of law, the statement portrayed on the defendant’s jacket was consid-
ered socially condemnable speech, but in context, “[t]he defendant 
did not engage in, nor threaten to engage in, nor did anyone as the re-
sult of his conduct in fact commit or threaten to commit any act of 
violence.”96  The Court employed a narrow analysis when it inter-
preted the surrounding circumstances and held no person could con-
sider the statement a direct personal threat because the jacket was not 
addressed to anyone specifically.97  This narrow approach exempli-
fied how the Supreme Court carefully scrutinized the issue of con-
demnable speech in relation to the First Amendment.98  Therefore, a 
simple public display of unfavorable speech cannot be easily labeled 
as proscribable speech.99 
In United States v. Cassel,100 the Ninth Circuit applied the in-
tended recipient test in its contextual true threat analysis in order to 
narrowly interpret the classes of unprotected speech.101  The court 
held that speech may be deemed a true threat upon proof that the 
 
91 See supra section III.B. 
92 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
93 Id. at 16. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 21-23. 
96 Id. at 16-17. 
97 Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20-22 (“Those in the Los Angeles courthouse could effectively 
avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes.”). 
98 Id. at 19-21. 
99 Id. 
100 408 F.3d 622 (9th Cir. 2005). 
101 Id. at 633. 
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speaker subjectively intended the speech as a threat.102  The defend-
ant in Cassel was convicted of interfering with a federal sale of land 
by intimidation because he attempted to dissuade potential buyers 
from purchasing property near his home.103  On appeal, the court stat-
ed a subjective intent analysis, not a negligence standard, is appropri-
ate to determine if the defendant’s speech was protected under the 
First Amendment.104  The court in Cassel supported its approach 
when it discussed the jurisdiction’s usual application of the objective 
reasonable person standard and stated, “[it] seems to suggest that the 
First Amendment permits punishing a threat made with only negli-
gence as to the statement’s threatening character.”105  This statement 
reflects the court’s belief that an objective negligence standard cannot 
justly support the stripping of a person’s First Amendment rights.106  
Therefore, the court held that even though a reasonable person stand-
ard was acceptable in prior opinions, it may not adequately protect 
one’s speech.107 
While many courts held proscribable speech statutes constitu-
tional when narrowly interpreted, other courts have found those stat-
utes unconstitutional on their face while conducting a true threat 
analysis.  Although the facts in Vives v. City of New York108 were 
similar to the facts in Bellrichard, the two cases had drastically dif-
ferent holdings.109  The court in Vives held New York’s Aggravated 
Harassment statute was facially unconstitutional to the extent the 
statute prohibited communications made with intent to annoy or 
alarm.110  Similar to the defendant’s writings in Bellrichard, the de-
fendant in Vives sent a politician written materials in which he admit-
 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 624-25 (stating that complainant testified “Cassel told him ‘that if I [Goodin] 
tried to build anything on Lot 107, that it would definitely burn.  He would see to that.  That 
if I left anything there, it would be stolen, vandalized. He would see to that.’ ”). 
104 Id. at 629-30. 
105 Cassel, 408 F.3d at 629. 
106 Id. at 631 (“Only intentional threats [that] are criminally punishable [are consistent] 
with the First Amendment.”) (emphasis added). 
107 Id. at 628-30 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. 
of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1079 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e observed that ‘the requirement 
of intent to intimidate cures whatever risk there might be of overbreadth.’ ”)).  See also su-
pra section III.B for a discussion of Vives v. City of New York, 305 F. Supp. 2d 289 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003), and infra section IV.B for a discussion of vagueness. 
108 305 F. Supp. 2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), rev’d on other grounds, 405 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 
2004). 
109 Id.; Bellrichard, 994 F.2d at 1319-21. 
110 Vives, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 289. 
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tedly intended to alarm the recipient with materials concerning the 
Jewish faith and current world events.111  If the subjective intent 
analysis as stated in Cassel were applied, the court could have found 
the defendant guilty of intending to threaten the complainant.112  
However, the primary focus of the court in Vives was the evaluation 
of the statute itself, specifically the court’s criticism of the breadth 
and vagueness of its language.113  Unlike the court in Bellrichard, the 
court in Vives did not place much emphasis on the mailings being ad-
dressed and sent to the complainant114 as a direct and personal true 
threat.115 
The court in Vives criticized the statute by attempting to apply 
the language of the Aggravated Harassment Statute to the case before 
it.  The court noted how the complainant and the arresting officer 
admitted that the materials in the envelope contained nothing threat-
ening per se; therefore, the defendant could not have “annoyed” or 
“alarmed” the complainant with his mailings.116  Further, the court 
stated the only materials that constitute a true threat fall into the cate-
gories of defamation, incitement, obscenity, or child pornography.117  
The court’s criticism showed that the language of the statute created 
an immense gray area,118 and that a person may not easily know 
which kind of conduct is proscribable.119  Given the ambiguity of the 
 
111 Id. at 293-94 (“The mailings include Vives’s handwritten and typed statements, as well 
as copies of stories and other items taken from general circulation newspapers.  Vives mails 
the materials to ‘people of the Jewish faith with the intent to alarm them about current world 
events that have been prophesied in the Bible, including the unification of the European 
countries into a single political and military entity.’ ”).  For more information on the mail-
ings defendant sent, see Bellrichard, 994 F.2d at 1320. 
112 Cassel, 408 F.3d at 633. 
113 Vives, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 299-302. 
114 Id. at 294 (noting only the envelope was addressed to the complainant specifically and 
not the defendant’s mailings).  In contrast to the defendant in Vives, the defendant in 
Bellrichard specifically addressed the county attorney in his postcards.  Bellrichard, 994 
F.2d at 1321-22. 
115 Vives, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 294. 
116 Id. (noting the arresting officer’s complainant report stated the defendant’s mailings 
did not have threatening wording within it.  The mailings were mainly political and religious 
statements and photocopy of a cutout newspaper article). 
117 Vives, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 298-99 (citing Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 
246 (2002)). 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 300-01 (“The fact that Vives was arrested pursuant to section 240.30(1) for en-
gaging in conduct that is firmly protected by the First Amendment, and that he no longer 
feels free to put his name and address on his mailings, exemplifies why section 240.30(1) 
cannot be reconciled with the First Amendment.  Section 240.30(1) is therefore unconstitu-
14
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statute as a whole, the court held that no form of analysis, as a matter 
of law, fact, or both, could determine when one’s speech would cross 
the line from protected to criminal under the statute.120 
Federal courts have used varying applications of proscribable 
speech statutes in which some courts found a broad category of un-
protected speech or conduct, while other courts went beyond the lan-
guage of the statute to narrowly limit what conduct is not afforded 
First Amendment protection.121  Finally, the court in Vives held no 
method of the true threat analysis could justify a proscribable speech 
or conduct statute when its language is vague and unconstitutional on 
its face.122  Even though there is a split among the federal courts in 
regard to what speech or conduct is proscribable, this split shows the 
continuous struggle of the courts to clearly define the line between 
protected and proscribed speech. 
IV. THE NEW YORK APPROACH: HOW A RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
MAY JUSTIFY A LIMITATION ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Regarding the right to free speech, the New York Constitution 
mirrors the right exemplified in the United States Constitution.  “Eve-
ry citizen may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments 
on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; and no 
law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of 
the press.”123  While the New York Constitution proclaims every citi-
zen has a fundamental right to free speech, it also declares every per-
son is responsible for the abuse of that right.124  This language specif-
ically reveals the limits on the right to free speech, and it is within the 
discretion of the New York courts to determine how far to extend this 
right.125 
A. PRIVACY INTERESTS IN A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 
The majority of New York courts have held the Aggravated 
Harassment statute constitutional, but only when narrowly interpret-
 
tional to the extent it prohibits communications, made with the intent to annoy or alarm.”). 
120 Id. at 299-302. 
121 Supra section III.A-B. 
122 Supra section III.B. 
123 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8 (emphasis added). 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
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ed.126  The New York approach includes a consideration of a person’s 
right to privacy, along with a contextual true threat analysis in order 
to determine if certain speech or conduct transfers from protected to 
proscribed.127 
In People v. Smith,128 the court analyzed the context of the 
speech in addition to the defendant’s effect on the complainant’s pri-
vacy interests in order to determine whether the defendant communi-
cated a true threat.129  In this case, the defendant first called a police 
officer regarding a complaint that he made, and the officer stated the 
manner was civil, not criminal.130  However, the defendant continued 
to call the station, and within a three hour time period, the defendant 
had called the officer twenty-seven times.131  Under a true threat 
analysis, the court narrowly applied the statute and held that the de-
fendant’s conduct fell within the “hard core”132 of the statute and that 
any vagueness in the statute’s language was not an issue in this situa-
tion.133  While the defendant had initially called the police desk with 
a legitimate complaint, the court held that the repetition of the phone 
calls entailed harassing, not legitimate, conduct.134  The court then 
analyzed the complainant’s privacy interests in addition to the de-
fendant’s specific conduct in the situation.135  Because the defend-
ant’s actions served no legitimate communication and constituted a 
repeated event in a short period of time, the complainant’s right to 
privacy was “invaded in an essentially intolerable manner.”136  There-
fore, once the defendant unreasonably invaded the complainant’s pri-
vacy, the defendant lost his First Amendment protection.137 
 
126 See infra section IV.A. 
127 See infra section IV.A; Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21-22.  Although a consideration of a per-
son’s privacy interest is an important factor in New York, some federal opinions discuss pri-
vacy concerns in relation to what speech or conduct would constitute a true threat.  Id. 
128 392 N.Y.S.2d 968 (App. Term 1977). 
129 Id. at 969-71. 
130 Id. at 969. 
131 Id. 969-70. 
132 Id. at 970 (“[I]t is enough to say that ‘even if the outermost boundaries of (subdivision 
one are) imprecise, any such uncertainty has little relevance here, where appellant's conduct 
falls squarely within the ‘hard core’ of the statute's proscription.’ ”) (quoting Broadrick v. 
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 608 (1973)). 
133 Smith, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 970. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 970-71. 
136 Id. (quoting Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21). 
137 Id. at 970-71. 
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The New York Court of Appeals in People v. Shack138 also 
analyzed the complainant’s privacy interests to conclude the defend-
ant’s conduct was not protected.139  The defendant in Shack called the 
complainant, his cousin and a psychiatrist, one hundred and eighty-
five times between December and May with threatening messages.140  
The court held that “an individual’s right to communicate must be 
balanced against the recipient’s right ‘to be let alone’ in places in 
which the latter possesses a right of privacy.”141  The court went on to 
state, “[u]nder some circumstances, the privacy right may ‘plainly 
outweigh’ the free speech rights of an intruder.”142  In regard to the 
defendant’s phone calls, the court stated that the complainant had a 
right to be free from unwanted phone calls, and this reasoning should 
serve as deterrence for people to not employ the telephone for “unjus-
tifiable motives.”143  Therefore, when substantial privacy interests are 
invaded, the right to privacy may outweigh a person’s right to free 
speech. 
Although a person’s right to privacy is given weighty consid-
eration in condemnable speech or conduct cases in New York, the 
courts may still apply a true threat analysis in these cases.  In People 
v. Thompson,144 the court’s contextual true threat analysis coupled 
with an examination of the complainant’s privacy interests led to a 
more narrow interpretation of what constituted a true threat.145  In 
Thompson, the defendant called the complainant numerous times in 
one month and on one occasion called the complainant and stated “I 
am on my way over there,” and, shortly thereafter, the defendant was 
outside complainant’s residence.146  The court applied a contextual 
approach under its true threat analysis when it stated plain “annoy-
 
138 658 N.E.2d 706 (N.Y. 1995). 
139 Id. at 706, 710-11. 
140 Id. at 709-10 (noting that the messages stated the defendant would set fire to the com-
plainant’s father’s home and the defendant would call the Michigan licensing board to have 
complainant’s psychologist’s license revoked). 
141 Id. at 710 (citing Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736, 
(1970)). 
142 Id. 
143 Shack, 658 N.E.2d at 710-11 (noting the justification for the proscribable speech or 
conduct statute.  The statute may limit a person’s free speech, but is constitutional because it 
is narrowly tailored and protects its citizens from unwanted phone calls) (quoting United 
States v. Lampley, 573 F.2d 783, 787 (3d Cir. 1978)). 
144 905 N.Y.S.2d 449 (Crim. Ct. 2010). 
145 Id. at 494, 496-97. 
146 Id. at 453. 
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ing” speech could not be the sole basis for criminal prosecution.147  In 
regard to the defendant’s phone call, which pointed to the temporal 
proximity between the communication and the defendant’s action up-
on it, the court narrowly interpreted the statute and held the incident 
was “facially insufficient to establish that the defendant made a genu-
ine threat with the intent to annoy, threaten or alarm the complain-
ant.”148  Concerning the complainant’s privacy interest, the court held 
that the defendant’s phone call did not constitute an invasion of pri-
vacy because there was a lack of evidence concerning the frequency 
and nature of the defendant’s calls.149  For the court, the overall inci-
dent was an isolated event rather than an actual threatening situa-
tion.150  Therefore, the facts in Thompson represented how a seeming-
ly concrete example of a true threat which is determined to be 
protected speech when analyzed using a contextual inquiry.151 
The protection of one’s right to privacy is highly relevant in 
determining which conduct crosses the protected speech or conduct 
barrier.  If a court concluded a person’s privacy interests were sub-
stantially invaded, it proves how the wrongdoer’s conduct was not 
meant to be protected, enjoyed, or praised.  Expectation of the right 
to privacy is a fundamental belief which many people share and want 
to protect.  First Amendment protection should not extend to the 
point where it hinders another basic civil liberty. 
B. Overbroad Equals Unconstitutional? 
Even though the majority of New York State courts have held 
the Aggravated Harassment statute constitutional, the court in People 
v. Dupont152 held the statute was unconstitutional as applied to the 
facts of the case.153  The defendant in Dupont was charged under the 
 
147 Id. at 459. 
148 Id. at 460-61 (noting that in order to prove a violation of the Aggravated Harassment 
statute, a communication must have actually occurred, and holding the only communication 
proven, the defendant’s statement that “I’m on my way over there,” was not a sufficient 
communication under the statute). 
149 Thompson, 905 N.Y.S.2d at 496-97 (“With no further description as to the nature of 
the calls and/or the complainant’s interactions with the Defendant, the Court does not find 
that the misdemeanor information is facially sufficient to show that the complainant was an 
unwilling listener.”). 
150 Id. at 461. 
151 Id. at 494, 496-97. 
152 486 N.Y.S.2d 169 (App. Div. 1985). 
153 Id. 
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statute after he distributed a magazine, which claimed that his former 
attorney was a homosexual, and the complainant alleged that it por-
trayed his professional status in an unappealing light.154  Although the 
defendant distributed the magazines around the complainant’s town 
and even left numerous copies in front of the complainant’s office,155 
the court did not believe the complainant’s privacy interests were in-
vaded, nor was the defendant’s conduct proscribed under the stat-
ute.156  The court supported its findings when it compared the defend-
ant’s conduct with the conduct of the defendant in Smith.157  The 
defendant’s conduct in Smith fell within the hard core of the statute’s 
proscriptions because the repeated phone calls were considered har-
assing conduct.158  In contrast, in Dupont, the defendant’s mere dis-
tribution of literature did not invade the complainant’s privacy inter-
ests or pose a true threat.159 
Further, the court in Dupont challenged the actual language of 
the statute when it analyzed the statute’s constitutionality as applied 
to the case.160  The court’s concern with the protection of First 
Amendment rights was apparent, and it stated, “First Amendment 
freedoms must be given weighty consideration in balancing them 
against the interests underlying challenged statutes.”161  Similar to the 
court’s concern in Vives, the court in Dupont was troubled with the 
vagueness of the statute’s language, which addressed, “[a] communi-
cation in a manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm.”162  The court 
broke down the very essence of the statute when it questioned wheth-
er the content of the communication, claims of homosexuality, inter 
alia, was condemned, or whether the actual form of the communica-
tion, magazine distribution, was proscribed.163  Also, the court exhib-
ited skepticism about the statute’s determination of annoyance—how 
 
154 Id. at 171-72 (noting the defendant called the complainant on one occasion stating he 
was coming out with a book soon which was an “exposé of the attorney's alleged homosexu-
al lifestyle, replete with cartoons and pictures.”). 
155 Id. at 172. 
156 Id. at 174. 
157 Dupont, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 173-74; see also Smith, 392 N.Y.S.2d 968; see supra section 
IV.A. 
158 Dupont, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 174. 
159 Id. at 174, 175 (“Although it may be argued that the magazine was obscene, this is nei-
ther an obscenity prosecution nor an obscenity statute.”). 
160 Id. at 174-77. 
161 Id. at 175. 
162 Id. at 172-76 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.30(1) (McKinney 2012)). 
163 Dupont, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 174-75. 
19
Dolzani: Can I Be Arrested for Being Annoying?
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2014
1004 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30 
does one measure annoyance to be compliable with the statute?164  
With these proposed questions on how to reconcile the ambiguity 
within the statute, the court determined that the application of the 
statute to this particular defendant’s conduct could not be justified 
under the First Amendment.165 
V. CONCLUSION 
It is evident from case law and modern societal norms that the 
protection of one’s free speech under the First Amendment is a right 
that will always be fought for, analyzed, and praised.  The balance 
between the law’s focus on policing and protecting people from un-
lawful conduct, and a person’s right to exert his or her First Amend-
ment freedom never falls at a perfect equilibrium. 
Specifically regarding New York’s Aggravated Harassment 
statute, both federal and New York courts have dealt with the reality 
of the conflict between the statute and the First Amendment.  While 
cases such as Vives and Dupont declared the statute facially unconsti-
tutional, other courts articulated a need for a proscribable speech or 
conduct statute, but held it is narrowly applicable.  Although the lan-
guage condemning “annoying” or “alarming” speech does suggest a 
level of ambiguity, a contextual true threat analysis will determine 
whether one’s speech or conduct goes beyond a protected act, such as 
being an “annoying” telemarketer and whether it becomes a 
proscribable act. 
The test set out in Brodeur has proven to be the most efficient 
test, when compared with other cases, to determine whether a per-
son’s speech is truly threatening.  Not only did the court determine 
whether the defendant’s conduct constituted a true threat as a matter 
of law, the court also undertook an intensive contextual analysis of 
fact in order to determine the meaning of the verbal statements and 
the poster.166  Unlike some cases previously discussed, the court in 
Brodeur heavily relied on what the intended recipient of the conduct 
 
164 Id. at 174. 
165 Id. at 174-76 (“It cannot be doubted that a statute drawn in so narrow a form as to 
criminally punish one who describes another as a homosexual . . . would be unconstitution-
al.”).  Because there are other civil remedies for the defendant’s type of conduct, such as a 
defamation action, the court held the defendant’s conduct was not justified as proscribable 
speech unprotected by the First Amendment.  Id. 
166 Supra section II.C.1-2. 
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interpreted the behavior to mean.167  When determining context, it is 
appropriate to evaluate whether the actual complainant reasonably 
believed the defendant’s conduct to be a true threat.  Many cases in-
volving New York’s Aggravated Harassment statute and other 
proscribable speech or conduct statutes perceptibly demonstrate a ra-
ther unpleasant relationship between the defendant and the complain-
ant.  Therefore, in the analysis of these cases, the intended recipient’s 
interpretation along with that of the objective reasonable person 
standard would provide a more exhaustive examination of the inci-
dent, and determine why these two opposing parties behaved in such 
a way. 
The law is not blind to the propensities of human nature.  
Courts realize our imperfections may cause us to be unreasonable on 
occasion, and that realization may save a person from being convict-
ed of a criminal offense and stripped of his or her First Amendment 
rights.  However, as stated in many cases, not all conduct deserves 
First Amendment protection.  In order to create a more uniform ap-
proach to defining the line between protected and criminal conduct, 
there needs to be a continuing effort by the courts to perform a me-
ticulous contextual analysis of the circumstances to prove whether 
the incident was a simple flare up of one’s temper or a serious and 
personal threat. 
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